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Improving Risk Assessment Communication
Abstract
Assessors often diminish communicating risk to show a single category or color without providing a full
context of the evaluation, basis, and assumptions behind the risk assessment. We attempt to remedy that by
presenting an approach to communicate risk assessments more completely with a clearer understanding of
these issues. First, we specify assessor should present necessary information as part of a standard risk
assessment statement. This information is discussed in four groups: 1) the activity or a collection of activities
being assessed, 2) the context of the assessment (who made it, when, with what scope, and how rigorously),
3) setting of the assessment (scenario, assumed conditions, timeframe, assumed choices, and mitigation
measures), and 4) the resulting assessment. Second, we propose an approach to standardize the presentation
of the actual assessment by applying the principles of simplicity, scalability, and consistency. The assessor
needs to develop outcome-centric measures for key activities to provide a basis to assess the potential
consequences, determine the success and failure points of the activity, and present the expected outcome for
each scenario setting. We standardize the presentation of the risk assessments as categorical risks, such as
colored ranges, by apportioning the expected consequences on the metric scales. We discuss combining
assessments for a single activity and for an aggregate activity. The United States Air Force has implemented
both our standard risk statement and our presentation approach.
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Abstract:  Assessors often diminish communicating risk to show a single category or color 
without providing a full context of the evaluation, basis, and assumptions behind the risk 
assessment.  We attempt to remedy that by presenting an approach to communicate risk 
assessments more completely with a clearer understanding of these issues.  First, we specify 
assessor should present necessary information as part of a standard risk assessment statement.  
This information is discussed in four groups: 1) the activity or a collection of activities being 
assessed, 2) the context of the assessment (who made it, when, with what scope, and how 
rigorously), 3) setting of the assessment (scenario, assumed conditions, timeframe, assumed 
choices, and mitigation measures), and 4) the resulting assessment.  Second, we propose an 
approach to standardize the presentation of the actual assessment by applying the principles of 
simplicity, scalability, and consistency.  The assessor needs to develop outcome-centric measures 
for key activities to provide a basis to assess the potential consequences, determine the success 
and failure points of the activity, and present the expected outcome for each scenario setting.  We 
standardize the presentation of the risk assessments as categorical risks, such as colored ranges, 
by apportioning the expected consequences on the metric scales.  We discuss combining 
assessments for a single activity and for an aggregate activity.  The United States Air Force has 
implemented both our standard risk statement and our presentation approach. 
Key words risk, measures, metrics, probability, assessment, and decision analysis 
1. INTRODUCTION
Risk assessments are an integral component of any corporate activity.  From safety to resource 
decisions, risk is a key component of articulating the future to facilitate the correct decision 
today.  Therefore, when speaking of risk, it is imperative the meaning is clear.  Within the 
Department of Defense (DoD), we often assess and report on risk to accomplish various future 
and disparate activities.  For example, DoD’s Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 uses the word 
risk 72 times in 88 pages.  Furthermore, Title 10, United States Code, Section 153 requires the 
Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit to Congress through the Secretary of Defense a 
report providing an assessment of the nature and magnitude of the strategic and military risks 
associated with executing the missions called for under the current National Military Strategy.   
Air Force leaders decided to consider risk assessments in making resource decisions.  However, 
they saw that individual risk assessments, prepared by various operational communities 
including combat forces, transportation, space and cyber, were predominately subjective 
opinions and that one assessment could not be related to another assessment.  Previous formats 
varied from risk matrices of likelihood and consequences to simple assertions of overall risk.  
Furthermore, resource “owners” were incentivized to label their risks as high risks in attempt to 
justify additional resources.  As a result, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force directed the Air Staff 
to develop a risk assessment process based more on quantitative data.   
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In response, we instituted a standard format that specifies eleven aspects of a risk assessment 
with the goal of adding consistency and traceability, while reducing the subjective bias.  In 
addition, we propose a standard presentation of risk assessments for planned future activities.  
Our proposed risk assessment can incorporate system modeling that is often performed in 
engineering risk assessments (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981; Haimes, 2009), but our proposal also 
allows for less detailed assessments if the Air Force personnel performing the assessments do not 
have the technical expertise or time to model completely the activity to determine its risk.   
 
Since our ultimate goal is to improve risk-based decision making within the Air Force, especially 
when compared to the current practice, we realize that the Air Force environment shapes our 
approach to assessing risk.  First, the need to guide an analytically informed discussion between 
both subject matter experts and decision makers, who may have limited understanding of 
mathematics and analytic techniques, shaped our thinking about the desired type of risk 
presentation.  To make our risk assessments understandable by even individuals who lack 
experience applying probability theory, our first principle for the risk assessment framework is 
simplicity.  Second, since Air Force senior leaders review many risk assessments, our desire is to 
present the results in an easy to understand format, yet still convey the extent of the risks.  We 
want the ensuing senior leader discussion to focus on the operational impacts and alternatives, 
rather than being side tracked into the mechanics of making the risk assessment or the expertise 
of the assessors.  Third, our military leaders must make decisions across diverse specialty areas, 
so we should make the assessments consistent across various warfighting communities, such as 
air combat, cyber operations, intelligence, and transportation.  Fourth, our goal is to make the 
risk assessments transparent and traceable, as possible; then leaders of disparate communities 
can build a consensus on where the military service should accept military risk without concern 
that individual managers have “gamed” their assessments.   
 
This article makes several unique contributions to the existing risk assessment literature and 
presents a demonstrable improvement over how the Air Force previously assessed risk.  First, we 
develop guidelines for a standard risk assessment.  For each assessed risk, this standard risk 
assessment includes four key categories of information that senior leadership should understand 
to make proper decisions about the risk.  The standard risk assessment statement has both 
improved the quality of the risk assessments and risk communication in the Air Force.  Second, 
we articulate a simplified and standardized approach for depicting risk assessments. This 
simplified approach is based on three principles − simplicity, scalability, and consistency− that 
we contend are necessary for the risk assessment to be operationalized in the military 
environment.  As a solution we propose an approach for risk assessment presentation that 
measures our ability to perform planned activities using various outcome-oriented metrics.  The 
third contribution of this article is that we include many examples from Air Force applications 
demonstrating how this approach can be used.   
 
Section 2 reviews some risk assessments performed in the military as well as some key 
principles for risk management and communication.  We describe our standard risk assessment 
in Section 3, and Section 4 presents the simplified approach for presenting risk assessments.  In 
Section 5, we discuss combining risk assessments both for different perspectives of the same 
activity and for combining activities with risk assessments into an aggregate activity with an 
appropriate risk assessment.   
2 
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The Department of Defense and its military services advocate risk management in strategic 
thinking (DoD, 2014), operational planning (CJCSI, 2009), training and doctrine (Army Training 
and Doctrine Command Safety Office, 2014), acquisition (Office of the Undersecretary of 
Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics, 2006), and virtually any activity (Chief of 
Naval Operations, 2010).  Many of these organizational instructions advocate using a risk matrix 
to assess and communicate risk.  Risk matrices rely on ambiguous language such as “very likely” 
and “high impact” and fail to measure uncertainty using probability (Cox, 2008).  Users have a 
false sense of security that the risk matrix is incorporating an objective risk assessment even 
though assessing the riskiness of an event usually relies on an individual’s subjective opinion 
(Hubbard, 2009).  
 
Quantitative risk assessments eschew these risk matrices and other qualitative approaches by 
developing models designed to numerically measure risk.  Kaplan and Garrick (1981) present a 
technique for probabilistic risk analysis that generally seeks to answer three questions: (1) what 
can go wrong? (2) how likely is it to go wrong? and (3) what are the consequences if it does go 
wrong?  More detailed and technical risk assessments for the military include examining the 
structural integrity of aging aircraft in the Air Force (Lincoln, 2000), modeling the risk a mine 
field poses to ships (Monach and Baker, 2006), and using information assurance and multiple 
objective decision analysis to assess the risk of defense information systems (Hamill et al. 2002, 
Buckshaw et al., 2005).  Caswell and Paté-Cornell (2011), Caswell et al. (2011), Kucik and Paté-
Cornell (2012) probabilistically model an adversary’s potential actions in different defense 
scenarios, such as nuclear weapons interdiction and counter-insurgency.  The recommended 
approach to communicating risk assessments in this article can encapsulate these types of 
quantitative risk assessments while still adhering to the directives outlined by senior DoD 
leaders.  Some of our recommendations borrow from techniques used in multiple objective 
decision analysis.   
 
The technique used to assess risk generally obeys some pre-established principles.  Haimes 
(2012) advocates a risk modeling approach for complex systems based on 10 principles.  Our 
proposals specifically align with his second principle of being methodical, particularly with 
respect to communication, and with his third and ninth principles on the importance of state 
variables and the timeframe.  The International Organization for Standardization (2009) outlines 
11 principles in order to help organizations and businesses make better risk management 
decisions.  The recommended approach in this article relies on several of these principles.  For 
example, risk management should be an integral part of an organization’s processes; be part of 
decision making; be based on the best available information; and be transparent and inclusive. 
 
Most of the literature on risk communication focuses on communicating risk to the general 
public, which may differ from the communicating risk to senior leaders.  Nevertheless, a non-
scientific audience can have trouble interpreting technical risk assessments (Fisher, 1991).  Risk 
managers desire to understand the broader context of the risk assessment and would like both 
quantitative and qualitative depictions of the risk (Thompson and Bloom, 2000).  Since several 
definitions of risk exist (see Aven, 2012), we need to be clear what we mean by risk.  We follow 
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the risk lexicon laid out by the Department of Homeland Security (2010).  It defines risk as the 
potential for an unwanted outcome as determined by the likelihood and consequences.  
 
 
 
 
3. STANDARD RISK ASSESSMENT STATEMENT 
 
The standard risk assessment statement is a statement of risk an assessor can present to a senior 
military leader. The statement summarizes the risk assessment and contains the most important 
information produced to support the decision-making process.  The four essential categories of 
information the assessor needs to convey in a risk assessment statement are: 
 
1) the activity or objective being assessed,  
2) the context of the assessment (who made it, when, with what scope, and how 
rigorously),  
3) the setting, or frame, of the assessment (scenario, assumed environmental conditions, 
timeframe, major decision and choices, and mitigation measures), and  
4) the resulting assessment (accounting for both the range of potential outcomes with 
their associated probabilities). 
 
We address each of these categories and conclude this section with the standard risk assessment 
statement.   
 
3.1 Activity Being Assessed 
 
The activity describes what future specific task or collection of tasks the assessor is evaluating in 
the risk assessment.  In military applications, activities involve the employment of military 
forces and may range from one individual aircraft sortie to an entire war campaign.  Plans to 
accomplish the activity describe the desired outcomes, often in terms of performance, required 
resources and schedule.  The assessor evaluates risk by measuring and scaling potential activity 
outcomes against its plan together with the likelihood of each potential activity outcome.   
 
3.2 Assessment Context 
 
The assessment context characterizes the development of the risk assessment.  It has four parts: 
1) who performed the assessment, 2) when they completed it, 3) the type of risks considered, and 
4) the analytic rigor of their assessment process.  Specifying the organization responsible for a 
particular risk assessment adds transparency that may reveal equities and potential bias. 
Organizations conducting or responsible for an activity may be too close to place the 
consequences in perspective.  For example, an organization may indicate the risk is less severe 
because it is expending considerable effort in the activity or, more pejoratively, the assessment 
may reflect on the organization’s performance.  Conversely, an organization may state the risk is 
worse because of the challenges it is encountering and envisioning how additional resources in 
the future would improve its operation.   
 
4 
 
When the risk assessment was completed is relevant since risk assessments indicate potential 
consequences of future events but rely on assumptions that are driven by the context of the 
current budgetary and geostrategic environments.  An assessor may need to revise a dated 
assessment if the likelihood of adverse consequences or the political realities of military 
operating locations have changed.  A dated assessment may need to be revised because the 
likelihood of adverse consequences may have changed or because political realities in parts of 
the world where the military is expected to operate have changed.   
 
The type of risk indicates the scope of consequences addressed in an assessment.  The 2010 
Quadrennial Defense Review (DoD, 2010) described several types of risk including operations, 
force management, and institutional.  The 2014 Chairman’s Risk Assessment (CRA) focuses on 
first two types, which they labeled Risk-to-Mission and Risk-to-Force.  Mission risk 
encompasses challenges in executing the military operations.  Force risk address problems in 
acquiring, recruiting, organizing, and training the units, systems, and personnel to be prepared to 
conduct operations.  We contend there remains a need for a third type to describe institutional 
objectives, such as meeting small business contract quotas.  Although overlap exists in these risk 
types, the DoD leaders prefer separate assessments because command hierarchies have different 
responsibilities.  The Combatant Commands have a larger role in the risk-to-mission and the 
Military Services are primarily responsible for risk-to-force and institutional risk.   Furthermore, 
separating these risk types makes tradeoffs between them, along the lines of a multiobjective 
decision analysis (Keeney, 1996), explicit.   
 
The analytic rigor explains the extent to which assessors used data and analytics to develop the 
assessment results.  Explaining the analytic rigor informs leaders about the quantitative and 
qualitative basis of the risk assessment.  Our framework requires assessors to apply the following 
criteria to provide a self-assessment of the process used to develop each risk assessment.   
 
Level 1 - The assessment is based on judgment through subjective input based on 
recognized experience or expertise, however no quantitative metrics are used to inform 
the risk assessment.   Current qualitative approaches such as risk matrices are categorized 
as level 1 rigor. 
 
Level 2 – The assessment expresses risk in terms of metrics; however, some evaluations 
may be informed solely by judgment without supporting empirical data. 
 
Level 3 - Analytic methods based on measurable data underlie all the metric evaluations. 
 
Level 4 – The assessment process integrates subordinate assessments into higher level 
assessments, which themselves are based on careful analysis and measurable data.  The 
assessment incorporates information about the mitigating actions into the analytic model.  
Most system modeling approaches common in engineering risk analysis are classified as 
level 4 rigor. 
 
Being clear about the analytic rigor behind each risk assessment helps the decision makers 
determine how much confidence they should put into the risk assessment.  We contend decision 
makers should place greater trust in those risk assessments with more analytic rigor. 
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3.3 Setting of Assessment 
 
While the risk assessment context focuses on its development, the setting describes the future 
environment of the assessment.  The setting includes five parts: scenario, timeframe, major 
decisions and choices, risk mitigation measures, and assumed conditions.   
 
The scenario provides the decision maker with an understanding of the hypothetical setting 
underlying an assessment.  Typical scenarios in the military are global operations during peace 
time, a counter-insurgency or low intensity conflict, and future warplans, to include both 
Operation Plans for near-year assessments and Defense Planning Scenarios for future-year 
assessments.  An unconditional risk assessment should account for the probability associated 
with the conflict in the scenario occurring.   
 
Conditions state any environmental aspect that the assessors assumed to have occurred in the risk 
assessment.  In our military applications, we often examine the risk of particular units’ 
performance assuming that a particular war occurs.  Conditioning enables us to consider our 
ability to respond to very unlikely events, such as a major nuclear war.  The conditions may 
subsume the need to specify the scenario; however, the assessor should clearly communicate 
when the risk assessment is conditioned on premise that a scenario or other aspects occur.    
 
The timeframe indicates how far into the future the assessment is set.  Usually, a specific year is 
stated although occasionally a range of years or a technological era may be specified. Timeframe 
is important because force structuring decisions can take years or even decades before they are 
fully implemented.  Consequently, these long-term force structuring decisions may do little to 
mitigate risk in the near term.  For example, developing a new fighter aircraft, which in recent 
history requires about 20 years, will do little to mitigate risk in scenarios 5 years in the future.  
Similarly, a decision to accelerate the planned retirement of a system with 10 years of expected 
life remaining will not affect the risk in a scenario 15 to 20 years in the future. 
 
Major choices prior to risk timeframe may affect the activity that is being assessed.  For 
example, strategy, policy, or tactics may be altered that may affect the potential outcomes.  Other 
major choices include significant systems, units, or facilities that are assumed to have been 
acquired or divested by the scenario timeframe.  For our military applications, major choices 
include platforms or weapons to be retired and acquired.  Adversary changes are included in the 
scenario information. 
 
Mitigation is a key element of risk analysis.   The consequences or the likelihood may often be 
reduced by shifting additional resources or new processes to support these tasks.  Mitigation 
specifies the actions across the areas of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, 
personnel, facilities, and policy that reduce either the likelihood or extent of adverse 
consequences.  Mitigation includes actions that senior leaders have taken or may take if required.  
An example of future actions is a military unit committing reserve forces if combat does not 
proceed as planned.  Frequently, mitigation is succinctly summarized as all possible actions at a 
stated level of command authority.  For example, Air Combat Command intends to mitigate all 
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adverse consequences with all means within its authority and given projected budget.   Senior 
leaders could direct these or additional mitigating actions be taken to reduce the activity risk.   
 
3.4 Resulting Risk Assessment 
 
The final piece of the standard risk assessment statement indicates the risk, which can be either a 
numeric measure (e.g., expected number of days beyond schedule) or a categorical risk index 
(e.g., high, significant, moderate).  Section 4 describes how the assessor can categorize risk 
assessment at a given level.  The risk assessment should take available mitigation measures and 
resources into account.  When the assessor specifies conditions, they should refer to the results as 
a conditional risk assessment.   
 
3.5 Standard Risk Assessment Statement 
 
We incorporate these four pieces of information into a single statement of risk, which we call the 
standard risk assessment statement: 
  
“For (Activity), (Organization) on (Date) assesses (Type of Risk) with (Analytic Rigor) for 
(Scenario), assuming (Conditions), in (Timeframe), with (Major Choices), and (Mitigation) is 
(Assessment).”  
 
As an example: “For the mission of providing space positioning, navigation and timing, Air 
Force Space Command on 1 January 2013 assesses the force management risk with level 3 rigor 
assuming scenario A occurs for the near-term with the Future’s Game force structure with an 
aggressive schedule for block X satellite launches is moderate.” 
 
This standard risk assessment statement establishes a consistent method of reporting a risk 
assessment specific to an activity.  Table 1 lists the eleven items (organization and date are 
together) with sample options to articulate a comprehensive description of an assessment. 
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Within the Air Force, we found insisting upon presenting all the information in this standard risk 
assessment statement greatly improves communication.  The Air Force replaced vague 
statements like “not acquiring new fighter aircraft is high risk” with “For Air Superiority, Air 
Combat Command in 2013 assesses the operational risk with rigor of 1 in the Integrated Security 
Construct in the year 2020 with the forces in the President’s Budget through mitigation with 
legacy aircraft assuming the war is initiated is low risk.”  While no one actually says these 
precise statements, we ensure that presentations and risk reports include all these pieces of 
information.   
 
While our goal was to communicate the relevant aspects of risk assessments, the development of 
standard risk assessment statement has also improved the quality.  Advocates for particular 
systems knew they would not be successful in obtaining additional resources if their risk 
assessments revealed biased opinions.  As a result, they refined their analytic process to provide 
rigorous data supporting risk assessments. 
 
4. DEPICTING RISK ASSESSMENTS 
 
The standard risk assessment statement presents the information required by senior leaders in 
order to make risk-based decisions.  Besides clarifying the content of a risk statement, our goal is 
to present the risk assessments to senior leaders in a format that is easy and quick to understand.  
Furthermore, the presentation should lead to discussions of the challenges that are driving risk.  
We do not intend our risk assessment depiction to change assessment methods or processes 
currently in use.  Rather, this presentation format provides a structured way for translating results 
from different assessment methodologies into a consistent and simple format so that assessor can 
present senior leaders information in a standard format.  We achieve the needed clarity by 
applying three principles of simplicity, scaling, and consistency.  Simplicity entails defining a set 
of vital actions within the activity that characterize the outcomes from the assessed activity.  
Scaling is defining the consequences to the activity, such as success and failure, in terms of each 
of the selected metrics.  Consistency defines risk categories to the assessed activity based on the 
outcome to that activity.   
 
We describe these principles more in the following subsections.  We do not attempt to make 
comparisons between the potential outcomes of disparate activities.  Our senior leaders need to 
decide the relative importance of activities and choose where their organization should accept 
risk.  Ultimately, by standardizing and streamlining the details, the risk assessment presentation 
should drive senior leaders to a strategic discussion of the challenges driving the risk assessment. 
 
 
4.1 Simplicity 
 
In essence, simplicity is identifying a set of metrics that reflect the success or failure of the 
activity.  This process can follow the value-focused thinking approach of identifying objectives 
and sub-objectives down to measurable attributes (Keeney, 1996).  In the military, a plan usually 
exists for the activity being assessed, and it specifies performance objectives, required resources 
or cost, and the schedule.  Performance objectives may include achieving desired effects and 
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avoiding undesired consequences.  The consequences for risk manifest themselves in some 
combination of not achieving the objectives, requiring additional resources or increased duration.   
 
For an assessment of an activity, at least one quantitative metric should be established for each 
area of performance, cost, and schedule, although often times we will utilize multiple metrics for 
a given attribute.  Examples of metrics for a plan to acquire a new transport aircraft might 
include percent of aircraft that pass initial quality control inspections (performance); production 
learning curve savings (cost); and time to deliver fifty aircraft (schedule).  As a combat example, 
several metrics may be selected to assess the risk of the Air Force’s ability to achieve air 
superiority in a conventional campaign.  The percent of theater airspace in which the US combat 
aircraft have freedom of maneuver after air superiority is achieved can serve as a performance 
metric.  The number of aircraft lost could be a metric for resources or cost.  The number of days 
until air superiority is achieved after combat is initiated could be the metric for schedule risk.   
 
We prefer three characteristics in the risk metrics.  First, the metrics should reflect the potential 
outcomes of the activity.  When focus shifts to the inputs, such as the number of aircraft assigned 
to a plan, the assessor and reviewers cannot as easily identify potential efficiencies or 
substitutions, such as other aircraft or ships that could mitigate the undesired consequences.  
Second, the metrics should reflect vital or critical aspects of the activity.  Otherwise, we distract 
the reviewers from the most important aspects of the activity that could cause it to fail.  Third, 
the risk metrics should be quantitative and based upon authoritative data sources as much as 
possible; for example, a database containing actual maintenance logs could be used to derive the 
mission-capable rates for particular aircraft.  Using quantitative metrics also helps to reduce the 
subjective bias.  For example, the risk associated with an adversary's nuclear weapons in a 
conflict could be measured by determining the number of surviving nuclear weapons as opposed 
to more subjective assessments such as the adversary's expected actions.  Despite our preference 
for quantitative measures, qualitative, such as cardinal-valued, metrics are allowed within our 
risk framework for those vital metrics that are difficult to quantify.   
 
Consider this hypothetical example: The Air Force airborne early warning and electronic 
intelligence collection aircraft have reached the end of their life.  The plan is to replace these 
aircraft by developing a multi-mission aircraft.   Several quantitative metrics for performance, 
cost, and schedule may exist for the new aircraft. 
 
Performance measures 
Average distance to track a 1 meter-squared target at 10,000 feet over mountains 
Average distance to track a 1 meter-squared target at 500 feet over water in sea state X 
Average distance to detect a 1 Watt emission at 1 GHz in thermal noise 
Number of 1Watt emissions at 1 GHz detected at 1000 feet above urban environment during 4 
hour loiter time at 1000 nautical miles range using a standard emissions schedule 
 
Schedule metrics 
Time until all mission systems are Technical Readiness Level (TRL) of 7 
Time to integrate mission systems 
Time to complete flight testing 
Time to Initial Operating Capability 
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Cost measures 
Cost to develop mission systems 
Cost to develop airframe 
Cost to perform integration 
Unit production cost 
Crew cost per combat air patrol (CAP) per year 
Fuel cost per CAP per year 
Maintenance cost per CAP per year 
 
In our military applications, we often measure the various consequences in different terms.  We 
see five benefits of expressing the consequences with various metrics.  First, the metrics maintain 
focus on the outcome of the activity.  Second, assessors can provide detailed information on 
underlying metrics can assess for themselves the reasonableness of the potential consequences 
and hence the risk assessment.  Third, many aspects of risk are difficult to relate to a single 
common metric such as dollars; what is the value of a lost life?  Fourth, relating consequences in 
terms of dollars gives the false impression that senior leaders can eliminate risk with additional 
funding.  Fifth, metrics for the various consequences assist in identifying actions to mitigate the 
consequences. 
 
Most, if not all, of the consequences in a risk assessment will be uncertain, and an accurate 
description of the risk may entail a probability distribution over the range of consequences for 
each metric.  However, to simplify the risk assessment presentation we recommend point 
estimates for the consequences, usually their expected values (for assessments representing 
"worst case" scenarios, the fifth percentile may be more appropriate).  This method simplifies the 
senior leader presentation, especially when reviewing many risk assessments.  However, 
expected value calculations can fail to account sufficiently for low likelihood, negative 
outcomes; this impact can be reduce by using conditional assessments that assume the unlikely 
occurrence happened.  Many general officers and congressional staffers review military risk 
assessments, and most of them have little background or experience in applying probability 
theory.  Therefore, we find that reporting a probability distribution over the range of 
consequences muddles the picture presented to the decision maker, especially when they are 
reviewing many risk assessments.  The assessor should have both probabilities and consequences 
available to respond to detailed decision-maker queries.  Conditional assessments, where 
unlikely occurrences are assumed to have happened, such as a major nuclear exchange, can shed 
insight into unlikely situations.  We discuss later how to translate these expected values will be 
translated to a categorical risk. 
 
4.2 Scaling 
 
The risk assessment framework needs to apply to a wide range of timeframes and activities, 
including humanitarian relief, cyber challenges, irregular warfare, conventional conflicts, and 
even nuclear wars.  In addition, we need to scale from small team operations to entire air 
campaigns.  Our application goes beyond the classic challenge of comparing “apples” and 
“oranges” to include “nuts” and even a “chair”.  For example, the Air Force may want a risk 
assessment on a single aircraft sortie and another risk assessment on the entire military campaign 
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containing thousands of sorties and minor activities.  If evaluated against a common scale, the 
risk assessment for the single aircraft sortie would be miniscule compared to the risk for the 
entire military campaign.  Scaling each risk assessment depiction to correspond to the outcomes 
of the assessed activity allows the decision maker to compare different risks.   
 
For each metric of the activity, such as cost, schedule or performance, we require the assessor to 
identify a range of outcomes and those outcome values he or she deems the points of success and 
failure.  This process resembles assessing the values of one and zero for a single attribute in 
multi-attribute decision making (Kirkwood, 1997).  Success usually corresponds to 
accomplishing the assessed activity as planned with no additional resources or time and at the 
desired performance level.  Similarly, failure equates to the conditions where the activity would 
be accomplished so poorly, require so much additional resources, or require so much extra time 
that its objectives are not achieved.  Expected activity outcomes worse than the failure point 
represent planned failures rather than very high risk events.   
 
In the air combat example, performance, success is controlling at least 90 percent of theater 
airspace and failure occurs at 50 percent controlled.  For the resource metric, the assessor may 
deem success to be 10 fighters lost and failure to be 50 fighters lost.  For schedule, success may 
be air superiority achieved within six days after combat is initiated, as specified in the operation 
plan, and failure is lack of superiority after ten days of air combat operations.   
 
Scaling does not eliminate all subjectivity from the risk assessments since the assessors 
subjectively determine the points corresponding to failure and success.  However, reviewers can 
readily discern those endpoints and decide to agree or challenge those values.  Thus, the 
framework increases transparency.  For example, if the assessor selects the failure point as very 
near the success value, a small reduction in resources rapidly deteriorates to a significant or high 
risk.  The ensuing discussion should focus on the activity and its potential outcomes of the risk 
assessment, rather than digressing into the qualifications of the assessor.  Scaling also avoids 
having the assessor subjectively prioritize one activity versus another activity in the risk 
assessment framework.  The decision makers who use the risk assessments must evaluate the 
importance of the different activities when they selecting where to accept or mitigate risks. 
 
4.3 Consistency 
 
Combining risks through their probabilities requires consistent units across the consequences.  A 
system acquisition cannot simply combine the cost risk expressed in dollars with the schedule 
risk expressed in days.  The use of a risk category enables analysts to bin ranges of consequences 
in each area and combine the likelihood of being in a particular category.  However, we often 
need to aggregate the risk assessments.  Within an activity, if the metrics are based on critical 
aspects of that activity, a simple approach is to characterize the overall risk as the worse value 
among the vital metrics for that activity.  Combining risk assessments of different activities into 
an aggregate risk assessment requires evaluating other potential mitigating actions.  For example, 
a single sortie may be deemed high risk, however, at the squadron level that specific risk may be 
mitigated to a lower level by backup aircraft being available.  Section 5 expands this discussion 
on combining assessments. 
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The Air Force, and the defense enterprise as a whole, tends to be most comfortable thinking 
about risk as categories, rather than as numerical measures.  As recommended in MacKenzie 
(2014), we use the numerical measures discussed previously to develop categories Air Force 
leaders want to see.   
 
The need for consistency determines the risk categorization.  While we prefer the knowledge 
contained in the underlying numerical risk measures, we categorize the expected risk into bins of 
low, moderate, significant and high consistent with the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff 
(CJCS, 2012).  We also include categories outside each end of the risk spectrum: expected 
success and planned failure.  We strive for consistency in the level of risk corresponding to the 
activity being accessed by aligning risk bins to measurement levels for a given consequence 
attribute on a given scale.  We found using well-defined metrics aligned with the consequence 
attribute, is key to successfully aligning risk bins to measures.  For most scenarios, analysts can 
make a probabilistic estimate of where the expected outcome for an attribute lies on the scale of 
interest.   
 
The Air Force defines risk categories for achieving the activity’s functional objectives, consistent 
with the definitions of the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS, 2012), as described below 
and depicted in Figure 1: 
 
Low (Green) – highly likely and all vital resource expenditures and schedules should be 
executed at or near planned levels or timeframes. 
 
Moderate (Yellow) – likely and some vital resource expenditures or schedules may have 
limited (acceptable) deviations from planned levels or timeframes. 
 
Significant (Orange) – questionable and some vital resource expenditures or schedules 
may have substantial deviations from planned levels or timeframe. 
 
High (Red) – highly unlikely; at least one vital resource expenditure or schedule is 
nearing failure; little margin remains for error in planning or execution. 
 
In addition to the four risk categories identified in conjunction with the CJCS process, we also 
acknowledge the two non-risk boundary regions that may also be the result of an assessment as 
follows: 
 
Success (Blue) – The expected value across the risk metrics is better than its defined 
success points.  In other words, the expected outcome is better than planned in terms of 
cost, schedule, and performance. 
 
Fail (Black) – The region beyond a defined failure point where the expected resources, 
timeline, or performance are deemed to be failure of the assessed activity.    
 
When the assessor predicts that the outcome will be better than the success value, this result may 
indicate excess in resources or schedule.  Conversely, the assessor reports outcomes worse than 
the failure endpoint as predicted failure highlights that failure is anticipated with near certainty 
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unless we provide resources or modify the schedule.  With these category definitions, we 
determine corresponding values in terms of our risk metrics.   
 
 
Figure 1.  Sample Risk Index Categories 
 
 
However, by themselves risk level definitions by themselves are insufficient for an analytically 
rigorous assessment process.  Quantitative standards for identifying thresholds between the risk 
levels are necessary to enable repeatable and traceable analysis.  These thresholds provide the 
basis for developing a quantifiable metric versus risk level scale.  The assessor should propose 
thresholds that the decision maker approves.  Assessors identify specific risk threshold values 
related to the impact of expected outcomes, and this risk assessment depiction allows the 
assessors to select threshold values based on their professional judgment and expertise.  The 
assessor must determine the category threshold values for each metric. 
 
The Air Force leadership often accepts 20%, 50%, and 80% on a linear scale as threshold values 
since they are published in the CJCS Risk Matrix (2012).  In order to keep the categorization 
consistent with the Air Force and CJCS and to simplify the categorization scheme, we 
recommend a linear scale based on the 20-50-80 framework, shown in Table 2, to transform each 
numerical measure to a category.  We assume a linear function, equivalently a uniform 
probability distribution, between success and failure, as depicted in Table 3.  If 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 
corresponds to the expected value for ensured success and 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 corresponds to the value 
deemed as certain failure, low risk occurs when the expected outcome is between 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 and 
𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 + 0.2(𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 − 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠); moderate risk occurs between 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 + 0.2(𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 −
𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠) and 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 + 0.5(𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 − 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠); significant risk occurs between 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 +0.5(𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 − 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠) and 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 + 0.8(𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 − 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠); and high risk occurs 
between 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 + 0.8(𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 − 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠) and 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒.  Depending on the metric, better 
may be a higher or lower numeric value.  The assessor determines the consequence probability 
distributions for each metric using historical frequency data (where available), proxy data, 
computer simulation, or otherwise subject matter expert assessment.   
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Table 2: Definitions for Metric Levels with common USAF Thresholds 
 
If unable to determine success and failure values, the assessor may be able to identify a value 
representing one of the other thresholds.  For instance, some organizations may find it difficult to 
clearly define when a measure predicts failure; however, they may able to express when they 
would want senior leaders to become involved (for example, when they are crossing from 
significant to high risk).  Assessors can use that information to replace an endpoint as an entry 
point for calculating the remainder of the thresholds.  
 
Given any two threshold values, an analyst can calculate the other thresholds assuming a linear 
progress.  Table 3 depicts the step function used for converting measures to an index for some 
combinations.  Point A in the table represents the metric’s expected success value.  Point B 
represents the metric threshold between green and yellow.  Point C represents the metric’s 
threshold between yellow and orange.  Point D represents the metric’s threshold between orange 
and red.  Finally, Point E is the metric’s failure value.  The metric threshold values will most 
likely be different for each metric (even if they are based on the same measure) for a different 
perceived threat or planning context.  However, the percentage of the measure’s spectrum of risk 
encompassed by each risk level remains consistent for its impact on the assessed activity. 
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Table 3 – Calculating Thresholds for a Quantitative Metric 
 
We do not require a uniform probability distribution to compare the risk index measured using 
different units.  If the underlying probability distribution for consequences, in terms of a metric, 
is non-linear, once the assessor scales each particular metric then they may use the comparable 
points (for instance 0th, 20th, 50th, 80th, 100th percentiles) on the known distribution to determine 
the metric thresholds points rather than using the linear scaling method described earlier. In this 
way, the assessor presents consistent and comparable information about the consequences of an 
activity to senior leadership.   
 
Professional judgment remains an important part of the assessment process.  Many of the risks 
we assess relate to future systems for which no historical frequency data are available, no 
reasonable proxies exist, and simulations lack credibility since too much speculation is 
necessary.  Our risk framework provides parameters for using professional judgment in a way 
that maximizes consistency throughout the assessment process and requires that professional 
judgment be documented and substantiated for traceability and defensibility. This transparency 
assists in determining the impact of judgments and may help make future assessments of the 
same activity be consistent over time. 
 
 
5. COMBINING RISK ASSESSMENTS 
 
Assessors encounter the challenge of combining risk in two different situations.  One situation is 
when various assessments of the same activity exist.  For example, an acquisition program may 
have risk assessments for performance, cost, and schedule that need to be combined into an 
overall program risk assessment.  The other situation is when the assessor is aggregating together 
many activities that have individual risk assessments.   
 
For combining various assessments of a single activity, the assessor must consider two related 
aspects of combined consequences and positive correlation.  First, for an activity, the assessor 
may deem the combined consequences sufficient to justify a worse risk assessment than any of 
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the individual estimates.  For example, the assessor may rate the cost and schedule as low risk 
since the expected outcome of each is 15 percent more than the plan; however, they may 
consider the combination of both those consequences significantly worse than either individual 
assessment.  In this example, if the assessor values a schedule slip of 15 percent at more than 5 
percent of the activity cost, the total consequence value of both the cost and schedule slip of 15 
percent would be valued at 20 percent, which would constitute moderate risk in our depiction 
scheme.   
 
Second, these different risks for the same activity are very likely positively correlated, meaning 
when one thing goes wrong, many things are more likely to go wrong.  If an activity is behind 
schedule, its costs are very likely also over budget.  With positive correlation, assessing the risk 
as the worst of the activity’s aspect risks is actually optimistic.  For example, an acquisition 
system encountering significant performance risk is very likely to also experience increased cost 
and schedule risk as more resources and time are dedicated to improve performance.  A program 
with only 80% performance risk should be rated as less risky than a program with 80% risk in 
each of cost, schedule, and performance.  The combined consequences and their associated 
probability need to be inclusive. 
 
Combining risk assessments from various subordinate activities is considerably complex.  The 
analyst should consider five aspects: 
 
Aspects that worsen the aggregate risk assessment 
- Does the scope of the underlying activities that have risk assessments encompass the 
entire scope of the aggregate activity?  If their scope is not collectively exhaustive, 
accounting for the risk in the scope of the aggregate activity that has not been addressed 
can only increase the overall risk.   
- Like combining aspects of risk within a single activity, if the consequences in the various 
activities are unique and positively correlated, then the overall risk is worse. 
- Do the underlying activities rely on common resources for mitigation?  If so, then the 
overall risk may be higher because too many activities rely on the same reserve 
resources. 
Aspects that lessen the aggregate risk assessment 
- If the individual risk assessments are not mutually exclusive, the overall risk assessments 
should account for where the individual risk assessments representing the same 
consequences.   
- The aggregate activity may provide an alternative approach to achieve the objective, 
which may make the underlying activities less vital.   Furthermore, the more 
encompassing activity may have additional resources to mitigate consequences.   
 
While the first three aspects can only increase the risk, the fourth and fifth aspects may reduce 
the overall risk assessment.    
 
For example of alternate mitigation, consider a fighter squadron that is going to execute 10 
missions.  While each mission may be significant risk, the squadron may be at moderate risk 
because it may have sufficient reserve aircraft and crews.  The Air Force Wing may be at low 
risk because it may be able to launch missiles to achieve the same objectives as the fighters.  In 
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this example, the more aggregate risk is less severe both at the squadron because of additional 
reserve resources and also at the wing because the wing has alternative ways to accomplish the 
mission.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The risk assessment framework described in this article seeks to improve upon current risk 
management practices within the Air Force by communicating risk assessments more completely 
and with clearer understanding.  We specified eleven aspects of a risk assessment and group 
these in four categories:  
1) the description of the activity or a collection of activities being assessed;  
2) the context of the assessment (who made it, when, with what scope, and how 
rigorously);  
3) the setting of the assessment (scenario, timeframe, assumed choices, mitigation 
measures, and assumed environmental conditions); and  
4) the resulting assessment. 
Requiring these pieces of information within the standard risk assessment statement provides 
more information to the decision maker and removes some of the bias inherent in the current risk 
assessment process. 
   
The principles of simplicity, scalability, and consistency motivate our approach to standardize 
the presentation of the actual assessment within the Air Force.  Assessors who follow such an 
approach can use these guidelines to present risk assessments of disparate applications to a non-
technical audience, and the approach allows decision makers to compare different risks and drill 
down on specific aspects of the risk if they desire.  The assessor needs to align the potential 
consequences along metrics, deem where success and failure occur for each metric, and 
determine the expected outcome.  We standardize presentation of the risk assessments as 
categorical risk indices, such as colored ranges, by apportioning the consequences on the metric 
scales.  
 
We describe combining risk assessments.   For different perspectives of an activity, such as cost, 
schedule, and performance, the worst risk assessment is a lower bound assuming that perspective 
is critical to the activity and the risk drivers for each perspective are independent.  The risk could 
be worse due to a positive correlation among risk drivers.  For aggregating activities and their 
associated risk assessments, the assessor needs to examine whether the activities 
comprehensively encompass the aggregate activity, as well as potential correlation among the 
individual risk assessments and reliance on common mitigation resources.  Furthermore, the 
aggregate activity may have alternative options to achieve the objective or offer additional 
mitigation possibilities. 
 
This article has focused on risk assessments in the Air Force, but the other military services as 
well as external government and private organizations could adopt a similar approach to 
communicate risks more clearly, depending on their specific needs.  In particular, the Marine 
Corps, Coast Guard, and Department of Homeland Security are strongly considering using this 
framework.  For organizations that are currently using risk matrices to assess and communicate 
risks because of their simplicity, our approach may offer improved scalability and consistency 
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(along with greater rigor) without sacrificing simplicity.  Our recommendations are especially 
applicable where organizations have multi-attribute value functions.   
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